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The Anzac centenary has come and gone, and the centenary of the Armistice too. Alec 
William Campbell, the last surviving member of the Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps of the First World War, passed away in 2002. All the veterans of that 
war, from all countries, have now gone. The War to End All Wars is now well and 
truly over. 
Thus, after eleven years of dawn services at the Australian National Memorial in 
Villers-Bretonneux, the French hosts were hoping to sleep in this year. Australian 
public opinion was incensed. Scott Morrison stood firm, and the Western Front dawn 
service will go ahead as scheduled this April 25. The First World War Anzacs are also 
honoured at dawn on Turkey’s Gallipoli Peninsula, and of course in Australia, where 
every year well over 100,000 people attend dawn services throughout the country. 
Additional dawn services are held in Malaysia, Thailand and Papua New Guinea to 
honour those who served in the Second World War. 
These days the dawn services on April 25 commemorate the sacrifices of all veterans 
from Australia and New Zealand. Of course, both countries also celebrate 
Remembrance Day on November 11, but that’s a commemorative day shared with the 
rest of the Western world. Anzac Day is different, and distinctively Antipodean. It is 
at the same time an expression of solidarity with the larger West and a declaration of 
independence from it. 
That schizophrenic quality is what makes Anzac Day doubly controversial. Many 
Australian and New Zealand intellectuals (especially republican ones) resent the 
annual reminder of the crimson thread that ties their countries to the United 
Kingdom and the wider Western world, while at the same time abhorring the 
patriotism of the masses who rise before dawn to celebrate their hard-won 
independent national identities. It’s a double-whammy of unwelcome competition 
for the cosmopolitan intellectual point of view. And it happens every year. 
Just in time for this year’s Anzac debate comes First Know Your Enemy: 
Comprehending Imperial German War Aims & Deciphering the Enigma of Kultur, 
(download it here) by John A. Moses with Peter Overlack. It’s a shame 
that Anzac isn’t in the title, since the book strikes at the heart of the cosmopolitan 
war against Anzac Day. It assaults the “presentism” of latter-day Anglophone 
historians who selectively reconstruct the Australian and New Zealand world of 1914 
to support their own political agendas rather than portraying it (as nearly as 
possible) as it actually was. 
For Moses and Overlack, there is a big difference between conscientiously 
recognising that our personal prejudices may influence the ways we understand 
history, and intentionally distorting history to match our personal prejudices. The 
fact that there are many ways to think about history doesn’t imply that all ways of 
thinking about history are equally valid. Moses and Overlack are determined to 
present the German threat as it was, as it was perceived by the Australians and New 
Zealanders of 1914, and as it was meant by the Germans themselves. They explain 
why (most of) Australia and New Zealand supported the war effort and had good 
reasons for doing so. They thoroughly debunk the “futility of war” narrative. And 
they firmly place Anzac commemoration within the heroic fight for Western 
civilisation against the barbarism of German militarism. 
It is all too easy today to lose the heroism of the First World War in the shadow of the 
Second World War. The Second World War was captured on film, with Adolf Hitler 
playing the ultimate villain and his black-clad personal security force, the SS, 
murdering six million Jews. Yet Moses shows how Hitler built on an existing 
military-state foundation with deep roots in German history. The Holocaust was not 
perpetrated by the Kaiser and his intellectual army of militarist professors, but it was 
made possible by them. As the Kaiser himself is apocryphally said to have 
telegraphed Hitler in 1940: “Congratulations, you have won using my troops.” 
As dominions of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand entered the First 
World War on August 4, 1914, in response to Germany’s gross violation of Belgian 
neutrality. The Kingdom of Prussia had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium in 
1839, and its successor state Germany reaffirmed this commitment in 1870. Yet in 
August 1914 Germany demanded that Belgium open its borders and lay down its 
arms as German troops marched through the country to invade France. Belgium 
refused, and as a result suffered German occupation, war crimes and near-starvation 
for the next four years. 
Germany’s Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, usually characterised as a 
“moderate” leader, expressed his frustration that Britain would go to war against 
Germany for the sake of a mere “scrap of paper”—the guarantee of Belgian neutrality. 
The British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, explained to the Chancellor 
that a “solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have 
in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?” Goschen reported Bethmann-
Hollweg’s reply as: “But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the 
British government thought of that?” 
Bethmann-Hollweg was certainly right about the price—to Britain, to Belgium, to 
France, and to dozens of other countries, not least Australia and New Zealand. Even 
to Germany. But the fact that a “moderate” German civilian leader of 1914 thought 
that international treaties should be swept aside for the sake of military expedience 
tells you all you need to know about Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany. Those other scraps 
of paper, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, were swept aside as well. Treaty 
commitments against the bombardment of undefended towns, the targeting of 
hospital ships, and the use of poison gas in combat were all torn up by Germany in 
the first year of the war. 
Remarkably, hundreds of German academics, jurists and even German theologians 
issued open letters defending German atrocities in the “Rape of Belgium” as 
necessary for the survival of German “Kultur”. Germany’s crimes in the very first 
month of the war included the summary execution of some 6000 civilians for not 
facilitating the German advance and the burning of the Catholic University of 
Louvain as a warning to the rest of Belgium. Similar (if not worse) crimes were 
perpetrated on the Eastern Front. The brutality of the German forces was no secret; 
it was the pride of the German Bildungsbürgertum, or “educated middle class”. It 
wasn’t Rudyard Kipling who first compared the Germans to the Huns. It was the 
Kaiser himself. 
Imperial Germany truly was the ISIS or Taliban of its day, and Moses (who is an 
Anglican priest as well as a professor of history) traces German militarism to deep 
religious roots in German Lutheranism. He contrasts the historical role of the 
Lutheran Church as the administrator of the Prussian state with that of the Anglican 
Church as the conscience of England—and by extension of Australia and New 
Zealand. According to Moses, Lutheran theology since Luther himself had portrayed 
the role of the Church as “only relevant in the private sphere” with “no brief to 
interfere in the business of politics”. Taking its cue from St Paul’s Epistle to the 
Romans (“the powers that be are ordained of God … they are God’s ministers”), the 
Lutheran Church made itself complicit in the crimes of the German state. 
The Anglican Church, by contrast, sought to act as the moral compass of the state. It 
still does—much to the chagrin of many of its more conservative parishioners. As a 
result, Moses argues, the “British Empire, as many at the time were convinced, stood 
for genuinely Christian values against the putatively pagan values of the German 
Empire”. 
And thus in the second half of 1915, at a time when Germany’s Lutheran pastors were 
exhorting their congregations to follow the Kaiser to victory, Australia’s Anglican 
priests were busy organising the “solemn day of commemoration” that would become 
known as Anzac Day. Representatives of Australia’s other denominations were 
involved as well, but Anglican ministers had the closest associations with 
government. Roman Catholic rules at the time prohibited “participation at public 
events where prayers might be said by heretical and schismatic” Protestants, in 
Moses’s slightly purple prose. The sometime bush missionary, sometime army 
chaplain Canon David John Garland was appointed secretary of the Anzac Day 
Commemoration Committee of Queensland on January 10, 1916, and the “father of 
Anzac Day” continued to shape Anzac Day traditions right down to his death in 1939. 
Throughout his account of Garland’s organisation of the first national Anzac Day, 
Moses puts the emphasis on solemn. For Moses, Garland was “a leader … who 
understood how a solemn public service of commemoration should be appropriately 
organised and performed”. Like Memorial Day in the United States, which emerged 
in the wake of the American Civil War, and Remembrance Day in the UK and 
Canada, Anzac Day is a holiday marked by an ultimately victorious nation to 
remember its losses in war. There are no “Victory Day” celebrations in the Anglo-
Saxon world, despite the fact that the West won both world wars. It’s hard to imagine 
what the Germans of 1914 would have made of that. 
Why should Australia and New Zealand have gone to war in 1914 for the sake of 
Belgian neutrality? That was exactly the question asked by Bethmann-Hollweg of the 
British. And one might go on to ask why Canada and Newfoundland took up the 
cause, or indeed why the United States intervened on the Allied side, instead of (as in 
1812) invading Canada. Especially where America is concerned, old Marxist 
arguments based on imperialism and new Marxist arguments based on racial 
solidarity just won’t cut it. An imperialist America would have done far better to ally 
with Germany and pick off British outposts at their most vulnerable. And racially, the 
two largest ethnic groups in America were German and Irish. No Anglophile 
tendencies there. 
Despite a hare-brained German plot to induce Mexico to invade the United States in 
1917, the United States was never seriously threatened by imperial Germany, and 
German dominance of continental Europe would hardly have hindered American 
global trading interests. As a result, the moral case for war, buttressed by Woodrow 
Wilson’s call to make the world “safe for democracy”, remains strong (though 
certainly not unchallenged) in the United States. 
Australia is another matter. Many Australian historians have been notably less 
patriotic in their appraisals of their own country’s motives for going to war with 
Germany in 1914. Or put another way, they have formulated a radically different 
interpretation of Australian patriotism that prioritises Australia’s narrow national 
interests (in the form of limiting Australian casualties) while decrying what they see 
as nationalistic and non-inclusive celebrations of Australian militarism (which they 
derisively call “the Anzac myth”). Moses consistently uses the dismissive phrase 
“Australian historians and publicists” to refer to “left-nationalist” writers who 
embrace the “presentism of left-wing thought”. He sees them as “ill-informed and 
ideologically biased [commentators] who seem only to believe what they want to 
believe”. 
Moses excoriates “Left-wing critics of Australia’s entry into the Great War” for 
seeking “to dominate the historical-political consciousness of citizens” through a 
selective reading of the past. In Moses’s telling, these “presentist” writers wilfully 
ignore the depth of religious sentiment and the adherence to the British Empire of 
the Australians of 1914. He might have added: the risk-tolerance. Today we are 
shocked at the fact that some 15 per cent of all Anzac recruits lost their lives in the 
war. But death was much more pervasive 100 years ago. For example, statistics for 
England and Wales show that roughly 15 per cent of all women of the time died in 
childbirth (equivalent statistics are not available for Australia). That does nothing to 
diminish the tragedy of premature death, but it does put things in perspective. 
But the most important charge of “presentism” levelled by Moses is the idea, 
widespread today, that “Germany constituted no threat to Australia during the era of 
Anglo-German rivalry”. The seven chapters by Moses lay out the civilisational 
challenge posed by imperial Germany to Australia’s Western values, while the three 
chapters by Overlack describe Germany’s specific plans for waging war against 
Australia and New Zealand. The book as a whole thus combines a history of ideas 
(Moses) with a history of operations (Overlack). But Overlack says virtually nothing 
about the Anzacs themselves, Gallipoli, or the Western Front. His subject is Germany 
in the Pacific. 
Australians today are used to seeing Manus Island in the news, but it is likely that 
few could locate it on a map. It is the westernmost major island of the Bismarck 
Archipelago that surrounds the Bismarck Sea off the northern coast of New Guinea, 
the territory once known as Kaiser-Wilhelmsland. Yes, in a slightly alternative 
history, it could have been the Germans running Manus Island. 
In the late nineteenth century, the German empire was on a buying spree all across 
the South Pacific, having purchased the “rights” (such as they were) to several island 
chains from the decaying Spanish empire. In the early twentieth century Germany 
held on-again, off-again negotiations with Portugal to purchase East Timor, too. 
Strong German influence over the Netherlands also created an ever-present 
possibility that Germany would take effective control of the Dutch East Indies, 
today’s Indonesia. In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm fled to the Netherlands at the end of the 
war. He was still there when the Nazis marched in two decades later. 
Overlack details how Germany’s Pacific cruiser squadron planned to raid Australian 
shipping, loot remote ports in Western Australia and Queensland, and even bombard 
Sydney. They were especially keen to draw British naval resources away from the 
North Sea and to delay (or better, sink) Australian troop transports. They hoped that 
a massive loss of life at sea would reinforce Australian political opposition to the war. 
Dozens of Allied ships were in fact captured or sunk by the German raiders in the 
Pacific, and the transfer of the Anzacs to Egypt was delayed by several weeks as a 
result. Anyone who wants a graphic illustration of German ambitions in the Pacific 
can visit Sydney’s Hyde Park, where a gun from the German cruiser Emden is 
mounted in the south-west corner, poised to fire down Oxford Street to Taylor 
Square. 
That Germany’s East Asia Squadron didn’t do more damage is due in part to the 
diligence of the Australian authorities, who immediately seized several German ships 
that were in Australian waters at the outbreak of war—ships that the Germans had 
intended to convert into colliers. Credit also goes to the timely dispatch of the all-
volunteer Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force to occupy German 
outposts in New Guinea. Much more important, however, was the fact that Japan 
entered the war on the Allied side. It may seem strange to think of Japan as having 
once been responsible for Australian security, but it was the Japanese who effectively 
neutralised the German threat in the Pacific. It didn’t do so out of friendship: Japan 
went to war in order to acquire German-administered Shandong Province in China. 
Had Germany made a credible counter-offer, things might have turned out very 
differently. 
If anything, Overlack understates the German threat to Australia. In the early 1900s, 
Germany was eager to acquire overseas colonies for emigration and settlement, and 
all of Western Australia had a white population of only 300,000; the Northern 
Territory, less than 4000. In the event of a total defeat of Britain, including a 
German victory over the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, it is not unlikely that Germany 
would have demanded substantial portions of northern and western Australia for 
colonisation. In such a scenario, Australia would have been in no position—legal or 
practical—to say no. 
The idea of Germans in Darwin is not as fantastical as it sounds. Japan might very 
well have stayed neutral early in the war to see which way the winds were blowing, 
Germany might very well have won the 1916 Battle of Jutland, and Japan almost 
certainly would have joined Germany in the carve-up of Russia in 1917. Had there 
been a Germany–Japan axis in the First World War, back when Germany still had 
Pacific ambitions, things might have gone very badly for Australia. And if Britain had 
lost the war, it is very unlikely that the United States would have come to Australia’s 
rescue. 
Though they mostly avoid current events, it is clear that both Moses and Overlack 
advocate a muscular foreign policy for Australia that closely aligns the country with 
other liberal democracies. Moses claims in his preface that “This book will show why 
the ability to stand up and fight when national security is challenged is still an urgent 
necessity.” Moses asserts, and Overlack clearly shows, that Australian national 
security was severely challenged in 1914 by German aggression, and that Australia’s 
only viable course of action was to participate fully in the British war effort. They are 
at pains to emphasise that the Australian Anzacs fought (and many of them died) to 
protect Australia, and that their struggles and sufferings were thus not in vain. 
Perhaps this focus on the necessity of Australia’s participation in the war is inevitable 
in the light of the “presentist” Australian narrative of the futility of the war, of Anzacs 
going overseas to fight other people’s battles. But if one accepts the authors’ 
argument that Australia had no choice but to defend itself against Germany, several 
persuasive chapters of this book are wasted on establishing the high moral fibre of 
the British Empire and the Anglican Church. After all, although it is certainly 
reasonable to defend oneself in the face of foreign aggression, it is not particularly 
noble. The two qualities are not mutually exclusive—the heroism of the Royal Air 
Force in 1940 was both necessary and noble—but Moses and Overlack seem to miss 
the point that they have very different foreign policy implications. 
If, as Moses would have it, the Anzac story shows that “the ability to stand up and 
fight when national security is challenged is still an urgent necessity”, what does it 
show when national security isn’t challenged? It’s hard to imagine any country 
threatening Australia in the near future. If the overall conclusion to be drawn from 
Anzac history is that Australia fought the First World War primarily in self-defence, 
then surely the main lesson to be learned for today is that Australians should look 
out for themselves, save $36 billion a year in defence spending, and disarm. That’s 
the lesson New Zealand has learned. Why not Australia, too? 
Yet if we take the many eloquent Australians quoted by Moses at their word, they 
didn’t go to war to defend Australia. They went to war to defend their honour, the 
freedom of others, and the future of Christian civilisation. They risked life and limb 
in an idealistic war of choice, not an unavoidable war of necessity. 
The idealism of Australian soldiers showed in their morale. In 1918, it was Australian 
troops under Australian command who made the crucial breakthrough at Amiens 
that ruptured the German lines and presaged the end of the war in France. They did 
so alongside another group of soldiers who were fighting a war of choice: the 
Canadians. By contrast, French troops, who were fighting a war of necessity on their 
very own soil, mutinied in 1917 and were unreliable in 1918, despite having taken 
losses no worse than those sustained by the Anzacs. 
There is no more noble testament to the power of ideals than the continuing 
dedication to duty of Australian volunteers right up till the end of the war. To turn 
their sacrifices into a narrative of the futility of war, as so many Australians do today, 
is a betrayal of the ideals that they fought for, no matter how sympathetic or well-
intentioned the purpose may be. Moses and Overlack recognise this, and are rightly 
critical of such “presentism” in present-day tellings of the Anzac story. But in their 
eagerness to establish that Australia’s war was one of necessity, they, too, come close 
to writing present debates into past events. 
Australians didn’t go to war in 1914 because they were afraid of German 
encirclement. They went to war in 1914 because it was the right thing to do. It is 
obvious from the tone of his book that Moses shares this sentiment. A book that 
made this straightforward argument would have been a better tribute to the values 
that Moses clearly holds so dear. 
 
